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Introduction
It has become fashionable to speak of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) as being in the
grip of an economic crisis. A substantial volume of writing and a number of,
often heated, debates have built up over 1981-83.
However, much of the debate and many of the writings operate at a very high
level of generalisation and at some considerable remove from concrete country 
experiences. In the first place they seek to generalise about SSA as a whole,
an approach which has a high cost in submerging differences. Even more
seriously they often start from normative positions - e.g. pro-private 
enterprise or anti-devaluation - and to use empirical data selectively in ways 
more likely to confirm the initial supposition than to shed light on its
strengths and weaknesses. This is a particularly easy weakness into which to
fall in SSA because much of the data is extremely bad. For example variations 
between + 2% and + 4$ or even - 4$ and + 2% for estimates of agricultural 
growth in the same country over the same period are not unknown. Nor in such 
cases, is it an easy matter to decide which series is ’least bad’.
As a result there have tended to be dialogues of the deaf and an excessive
concentration on specific themes wrenched out of the overall economic context. 
Selection sometimes seems to relate to ease of discussion in general terms as 
much as to intrinsic merit. Prices are important and easy to analyse at a
high level of generality. Transport and storage bottlenecks and gaps are
often just as important but little can be said except in concrete contexts. 
As a result general studies tend to list them and pass on but to analyse and 
discuss prices in general terms at great length. As a result subsequent case 
studies at country level also often concentrate on macro-monetary issues and 
give only limited attention to micro and sectoral ’’real” constraints or 
obstacles. This process has polarised positions, and, in doing so, has
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reduced both the growth of factual knowledge and the ability to devise 
operational programmes either domestically or in conjunction with such 
external bodies as the World Bank and IMF.
This overview of the current and recent past SSA economic scene makes no claim 
to definitiveness, to a detailed analytical exposition or to providing its own 
empirical justification. What it does attempt to do is to set out a number of 
the key questions about SSA economies and their performance and to do so in a 
non-polemic and readily comprehensible way. Within this approach the 
complexity and inter-relationships of issues and policies are stressed, as is 
the very substantial diversity of experience among SSA economies.
The picture which emerges is a good deal more complex than the hard-line 
advocates and opponents of particular strategies and policies appear to 
assume. While both the present situation and short term prospects are - with 
a handful of exceptions - far from bright, the available data does not support 
either the assertion that the 1970?s were a decade of unrelieved failure or a 
conviction that the economic future of Africa - and more important, of 
Africans - is veering unrestrainably and irrevocably towards disintegration. 
If the review of issues and of data which follows helps provide a foundation 
for research on elucidating the contextual and structural weaknesses 
underlying SSA's unusually poor economic performance over 1980-83 it will have 
served its primary purpose. If such a review can also serve to clarify and 
assist that dialogue the purpose of which is to procure action to correct such 
weaknesses, so much the better.
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Questions Page
Did all SSA economies have a bad record throughout the 1970s? 4
Why, at least since 1979, have results been almost uniformly bad?
Have SSA governments grossly mishandled their responses to recession? 4
Why has public sector capacity to act declined so sharply? 5
Have SSA states overexpanded their public sectors? 6
How much of SSA's failure to respond effectively flows from bad 
economic management? 8
Have Francophone countries done better economically? 8
What is special about the Francophone West African, Central African,
Mali and Malagasy central banks? 9
Does the greater number of middle level Europeans and old colonial 
hands benefit Francophone African states? 10
Do many SSA economies have serious external debt problems or is it 
only a handful, such as Zaire, Sudan, Nigeria, Ivory Coast? 10
How much would rescheduling help? 11
Isn't it vital for SSA economies to export more? 12
Why is SSA agriculture performing so badly? 14
Do not SSA economies urgently need 'to get the prices right'? 15
What about investment? 16
Shouldn't SSA economies be practising austerity? 17
Is there a case for more policy dialogue? 18
Note: 'SSA' is used as an abbreviation for 'sub-Saharan Africa' throughout.
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DID ALL SSA ECONOMIES HAVE A BAD RECORD THROUGHOUT THE 1970S?
No. The decade can be divided pretty clearly into two periods. Over
1970-75, SSA as a region had growth rates below the LDC average. Over
1976-79 the SSA average (at about 6$) was above the LDC average. Over
the decade as a whole, according to data available from UNCTAD, the SSA 
average was below the LDC average but that had also been true of the 
1960s. In the 1980s it - like Latin America - has had very low or 
negative growth.
Within SSA results varied widely. There were countries of chronically 
poor economic performance, e.g. Ghana, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Madagascar, 
Zaire. Other countries stagnated, e.g. Senegal, Benin, Upper Volta. 
Civil war, external intervention and domestic strife lowered growth rates 
(or caused absolute declines) in Uganda, Chad, Rhodesia (as it then was), 
Angola, Mozambique, Central African Republic. Very poor mineral prices 
from 1975 onwards hit several economies very hard, notably those of 
Mauritania and Zambia. However, many countries maintained over most of 
the decade growth rates of the order of 5$ or above, e.g. Botswana, 
Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Swaziland, Tanzania.
The main cause of ecomomic success cannot be uniformly ascribed either to 
the availability of resources, nor to the chosen economic strategy. 
Policies on such issues as distribution, rural/urban balance, the role of 
state enterprise, etc. varied widely. However, all the successes sought 
to achieve or to maintain above-the-line budgetary balances and - with 
less uniformity of results - to avoid severely overvalued exchange rates.
WHY, AT LEAST SINCE 1979, HAVE RESULTS BEEN ALMOST UNIFORMLY BAD?
HAVE SSA GOVERNMENTS GROSSLY MISHANDLED THEIR RESPONSES TO RECESSION?
Of all regions, SSA has been hit hardest by the 1979-83 recession. 
Deterioration in terras of trade of the order of 33$ to 50$ between 1976 
and 1982 have been common. A majority of countries have also suffered 
from severe droughts.
Many of those conditions prevailed in 1973-74 as well. What was notable
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then was the speed and relative success of a large number of SSA 
adjustment programmes leading to good performances between 1976 and 1979.
The SSA experience between 1979 and 1983 has been very different for a 
number of reasons. First, governments believed 1979-80 would have an 
impact on the global economy like 1973-74 - a sharp shock, a short slump 
and a rapid recovery. (They read the OECD, IMF, IBRD studies of the day 
which predicted exactly that and prepared their responses accordingly.) 
In the event this was unwise - there was no global recovery until 1983 
and its impact has still barely affected the real price of most SSA 
exports.
Second, over 1979-83 there was no parallel to the Oil Facility and other 
fairly soft/easy method of access to credit made available in 1973-74. 
This led many countries into unwise use of supplier credits and of 
commercial bank loans to bridge what they expected to be a short slump. 
When the slump continued and interest rates (both nominal and real) rose 
sharply, their external debt service positions became unmanageable. In 
over half the cases, substantial commercial payments arrears built up 
despite sharp (in many cases 25Í or more) cuts in real import volume.
Third, the unexpectedly long duration of the slump, and cuts in imports 
forced by limited credit availability combined with rising debt service 
costs, eroded government revenue bases. Despite real cuts on spending 
under most heads, recurrent budget deficits became chronic even in states 
like Malawi and Tanzania which had previously had above-the-line 
surpluses. These deficits interacted with the terms of trade 
deterioration to produce far more significant currency overvaluations 
than had been experienced previously.
WHY HAS PUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITY TO ACT DECLINED SO SHARPLY?
The simple answer is lack of resources. For example in Zambia rural 
health services usually lack fuel and spares for vehicles, drugs and food 
for patients, equipment and kerosine for clinics. Extension services in 
several countries cannot sensibly advise use of fertilizer, insecticide 
or improved seed because none of these is available.
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In some countries - notably but not exclusively the poorer Francophone 
ones - civil servants and municipal employees are commonly paid up to 
three months in arrears. Nearly everywhere attempts to regain budgetary 
balance have reduced the purchasing power of government employees’ pay 
draconically. e.g. in Uganda a clerk or labourer’s monthly pay as of 
early 1984 would barely buy one week's staple food for his family; in 
Zaire a secretary's salary will just about cover the cost of going to and 
from work.
In other countries, as the result of two decades of intensive training 
backed by substantial external support, competent personnel especially in 
health and education are available. Unfortunately lack of adequate 
government revenue or import capacity means that drugs, textbooks, 
kerosine for fridges, desks and chairs, paper and pencils, beds and
medical equipment, vehicles and fuel cannot be provided in adequate 
quantities for the personnel to function properly. e.g., Recently only 
an emergency foreign grant averted the total absence of drugs in the main 
Swaziland hospital at Mbabane.
HAVE SSA STATES OVEREXPANDED THEIR PUBLIC SECTORS?
Sometimes but not always. On average SSA government budgets - with the 
exception of social security and related transfer payments - are about 
the same per cent of GDP as in other areas of the world. Nor is there a
marked average difference in their makeup by type of spending. Social
security and related transfer payments are the lowest of any region,
e.g. in Tanzania government pensions, national provident fund and 
maizemeal subsidies - the main social security and related transfer 
payment items - are about 2% of GDP.
SSA public enterprise investments vary widely in operating efficiency and 
profitability. Few generalisations can be made safely even within 
countries. Public enterprises dealing with food procurement and 
distribution (in most cases, the lineal descendants of colonial boards) 
are relatively high cost and limited in their ability to distribute 
throughout the country. But these failings also characterize most
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private and co-operative enterprises dealing with food production and 
distribution.
In two senses the public sector is overextended. First, the present 
eroded revenue base does not allow full operation of what capacity 
exists. In cases such as health, education, water, transport where the 
need is clearly for more, not less, services for economic as well as 
humane reasons, the cure lies primarily in restoring the revenue base. 
For states (e.g. Kenya, Nigeria) not facing significant external threats 
some cutbacks in defence spending may well be appropriate. Similarly in 
some states the proportion of expenditure on administrative services 
appears unduly large.
Second, given the limited financial and personnel resources, greater 
selectivity in determining what to do would seem necessary. In most 
cases the actual choice is not between whether a service is provided 
publicly or privately; it is between whether it is provided publicly or 
not at all. In present circumstances, a more limited range of functions 
carried out better would usually be desirable.
In respect of public enterprises the choices are somewhat more complex. 
For a number of sectors - e.g. rail transport, electricity generation, 
airlines, harbours - there is neither a realistic private sector 
alternative nor an option to close down. In others the choice is 
effectively between public sector African (or mixed African/foreign) and 
foreign private enterprise. These constraints do imply that where 
African private (or co-operative) enterprises can do the job - e.g. small 
scale industry, retail trade, most road transport - public sector 
enterprise participation needs special - and convincing - justification. 
Further experience elsewhere - notably in Brazil and South Korea - 
suggests that detailed, selective state intervention at product and 
enterprise level is important to achieving overall economic and expert 
growth. Credit and import allocations are, apparently, particularly 
critical. Whether 3uch interventions work more efficiently with a 
substantial public sector presence in the financial and external trade 
fields is open to debate. The appropriate answer is likely to vary from 
state to 3tate, and over time, and to be related as much to the number of 
qualified, experienced citizen personnel available as to ideological
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choices.
HOW MUCH OF SSA'S FAILURE TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY FLOWS 
FROM BAD ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT?
This varies widely from country to country. Just as the 1970’s economic 
performance record was very uneven so also was the quality of economic 
management. In every country some policy mistakes and a greater number 
of weaknesses in implementation and management can be cited. However, it 
is not convincing to argue that economic management suddenly became worse 
as of 1979.
What clearly did happen was that it became less able to produce desired 
results. That, however, was true in all regions - not excluding OECD - 
over 1979-82. The failure was more pronounced in SSA because the 
external shocks were greater both relative to the physical and financial 
capacity to respond and to the ability of economic management to tackle 
harder problems.
Failure to achieve results - for whatever reasons - is bad for morale. 
When repeated failures accumulate over several years, individual and 
institutional managerial capacities are eroded. That process has 
occurred already in several states which performed badly in the 1970’s; 
there is a real danger that it will occur in several more if the problems 
which have overwhelmed many SSA countries in the past five years remain 
unresolved.
HAVE FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES DONE BETTER ECONOMICALLY?
Probably not. If one pairs roughly comparable Francophone and Anglophone 
economies and looks at a range of indicators, e.g. past and present 
growth rates, external balance, external debt burden and adequacy cf 
public services, it is possible to reach an opposite conclusion. Much 
depends on which indicators of economic performance are chosen.
Botswana has a better record than Gabon. Cameroon has performed better
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than Nigeria. Kenya ha3 done somewhat better than the Ivory Coast 
(especially taking into account the latter*s appalling external debt 
position). While both Sierra Leone and Guinea have been consistently
unsuccessful economically, the Guinean record is worse. Senegal -
despite near stagnation for most of two decades - has done less badly
than Ghana. Malawi has outperformed Mali by a substantial margin and
Tanzania has a much better record than the Malagasy Republic.
What is evident is that the majority of Francophone African states have 
usually avoided recurrent budget deficits, open detailed quantitative 
import controls and - less markedly - sustained high rates of inflation. 
The reason for this - and their typically higher external debt service 
burden - lies in the monetary and exchange rate system which members of 
the franc zone operate.
WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT THE FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICAN, CENTRAL AFRICAN, 
MALI AND MALAGASY CENTRAL BANKS?
These are operated for the two groups of states, as well as for Mali and 
- less rigidly -Madagascar, on the lines of the last phase of the British 
Colonial Currency Boards. They have strict limits on fiduciary issues 
and are basically French-run in terms of policy. Change of currency 
parities against the French franc (or each other) is only permitted 
exceptionally.
Nor is exchange control against France allowed. The French leverage is 
exerted partly through the provision of French personnel but even more 
through the provision of French Treasury Funds to cover approved state 
and external balance deficits.
This framework does prevent access to the printing press for the finance
of government deficits; it also prevents devaluation as a cure for
overvaluation and ties SSA real exchange rate changes to those of France 
which is not very logical given their differences in economic structures.
As a result it leads to smaller government spending (or to non-payment 
of bills including wages and salaries) and to somewhat greater price 
stability. It has also led to far greater use of short and medium term
external commercial credit (£3,500 million due over 1984-88 by the Ivory
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Coast) and to heavier taxation of agricultural exports - neither of which 
features can be considered evidence of a satisfactory strategy on broader 
economic grounds.
DOES THE GREATER NUMBER OF MIDDLE-LEVEL EUROPEANS AND OLD COLONIAL
HANDS BENEFIT FRANCOPHONE AFRICAN STATES?
Yes and no. The greater numbers of mechanics, secondary school teachers, 
hairdressers and foremen are the counterpart to less training 
especially less technical and vocational training. That seems to be a 
weakness of Francophone Africa and of France's form of development 
cooperation which is in contrast to Commonwealth Africa's relative 
success in training and the strong cooperation it has received from the 
UK.
Commonwealth African governments may at times have been too eager to 
localise jobs, but on balance it is doubtful that the quality of their 
basic line officers is now lower than that of Francophone states with 
their larger numbers of former colonial civil servants. Part of the 
difference is terminological. Anglophone states use more specialist 
consultants and technical assistance personnel from a variety of sources 
and tend to call such people advisors even when they are doing standard 
civil service work.
A real difference does exist in respect to the staffing of Treasuries and 
Central Banks. But the effect upon policy and administration appear to 
be as much the result of maintaining fixed Franc zone parities, to the 
absence of exchange controls, to the limitation of fiduciary issues and 
to the operation of the French Treasury special account as to the actual 
nationality of the personnel employed.
DO MANY SSA ECONOMIES HAVE SERIOUS EXTERNAL DEBT PROBLEMS OR IS IT
ONLY A HANDFUL, SUCH AS ZAIRE, SUDAN, NIGERIA, IVORY COAST?
Most SSA economies have very severe external debt and debt service 
problems. Only Botswana and the Cameroon can be said unambiguously to
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combine viable medium term import capacity, sound external balance 
parameters, and comfortable debt service ratios. Gabon may 30on reach 
that position but only after, five years of internal recession to overcome 
its external debt crisis.
Zaire, the Sudan, Nigeria and now the Ivory Coast are the best known 
cases because they are absolutely the largest. Smaller countries debts 
whose debt-servicing costs now require 2 5-5 0% of export earnings are 
equally weighed down. But the absolute size of the debt is not large 
enough to attract the attention of the international financial community.
Further, total SSA external debts include very high proportions of very 
short term credits (i.e. under one year), commercial arrears and IMF 
drawings which do not figure in the World Bank's debt statistics but do 
need to be serviced. Taking these into account, the typical African 
economy has a debt service ratio of 35—40* of export earnings. Even 
countries like Zimbabwe which had limited debt in 1980, which have 
borrowed only for priority capital projects, and which have sought to 
maximize soft and long term finance, have debt service ratios which are 
already over 3 0% and likely to rise.
HOW MUCH WOULD RESCHEDULING HELP?
Rescheduling by itself will not help much in the more acute cases - at 
least not unless the period and terms are to be significantly different 
from current London and Paris Club models.
To be able to service debt African countries must increase exports. To 
do so they need to avoid economic collapse and to invest in the 
production of exportable goods and in the necessary supporting 
infrastructure. This means more imports for specific investments, more 
imports to keep the economies going and, more imports to maintain or 
rehabilitate the existing capital stock. Import cuts in many economies 
are now starving the export sector of materials and spare parts and 
debilitating processing and transport capacity.
Two or three year roll-forward debt rescheduling exercises cannot provide
4
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all of the foreign exhange needed to rehabilitate or expand exports to 
the extent necessary to enable the debt eventually to be re-paid. Both 
new lending (public and/or private) and interim balance of payments 
support funding are needed too. More useful than repetitive one or two 
year capital payment reschedulings would be a number of packages 
combining 5 to 8 year capital payment deferral with aid and selective new 
lending.
In some cases - e.g. Zaire, Sudan and, counting arrears, Tanzania and 
Zambia - it is clear that the full amount lent can never be recovered. 
An analogy to the reconstruction of company debt should apply here. It 
would be better to write off some of the debt (or to achieve the same 
result by turning it into longer term, low interest obligations) in order 
to allow a practicable programme for servicing the rest.
ISN’T IT VITAL FOR SSA ECONOMIES TO EZPORT MORE?
Yes. Many are now covering only 50 to 601* of their imports from export 
earnings. Worse, this is being achieved at import levels which have been 
cut so much that these economies, including their export sectors, cannot 
function properly. The need to raise export earnings could not be 
clearer.
In some, but by no means all cases, the export sectors are large relative 
to GDP and are leading sectors which create growth in demand for others - 
for example in Botswana. What is general is that SSA economies (and low 
income economies excluding India and China in general) are highly 
sensitive to fluctuations in real levels of imports. When these are 
stagnant or cut so too is domestic production. Ironically this is most 
true when imports are largely directed into domestic production (not 
final consumption), are a relatively low proportion of output value at 
factor cost, but are vital to production. Forced cutbacks in such imports 
have a negative multiplier effect on GDP. For example in Tanzania the 
ratio of operating inputs and spares to ex factory value of manufacturing 
is - on average - between 20 and 25?. Therefore a $1 cut in the real 
value of such imports causes a $3 to $4 constant price los3 of GDP 
distributed among manufacturing and sectors selling domestic inputs to
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it. The most pressing and most general reason why SSA economies must 
raise export earnings is, therefore, to raise real import capacity to 
sustain, to restore (and to expand) domestic production, especially 
domestic production for domestic use.
Identifying what is to be done requires looking at the cause of declines 
in real earned import and debt service capacity provided by exports.
Part of the problem is the fall in the real prices of many exports. This 
has both reduced earnings on present volumes and acted as a disincentive 
to expansion. But SSA economies can do little about this on their own, 
and the OECD recovery has not yet caused much improvement - especially to 
prices for minerals.
Therefore either the volume of present exports must be sustained, 
restored, raised or new ones developed. But which exports? To that 
question there are no easy, general answers - except wrong ones. If all 
SSA economies were to raise coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco, sugar and cotton 
exports 5 to 8Í a year, the price elasticities and their combined share 
of world trade in these products are such they they would earn less, not 
more foreign exchange. SSA is not, in general, a low labour cost area. 
Its nominal wages are often above those of South Asia but its labour 
productivity is not. Very few countries can mount labour-intensive, 
export zone type programmes with any prospect of success.
Some specific answers can be given:- Ghana needs to rehabilitate cocoa, 
Uganda tea, the Sudan cotton and Senegal groundnuts. Zimbabwe should 
rehabilitate and expand ferrochrome and steel production. New natural 
resource based products with reasonable market prospects, e.g. 
ammonia/urea in Tanzania should receive priority attention. But these 
approaches need to be worked out case by case. They require both time 
and finance to implement. All they could provide would be a start to the 
rebuilding of current account positions. Additional new exports need to 
be identified and developed on a pragmatic country by country basis - and 
on a substantial scale. Their urgency is reinforced by the fact that for 
their initial 5 to 8 years of operation servicing the external debt 
incurred to create them will severely limit their contribution to foreign 
exchange available for augmenting general import capacity.
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WHY IS SSA AGRICULTURE PERFORMING SO BADLY?
Several reasons. A very important reason - especially for export crops - 
is price. Neithr overvalued exchange rates nor falling real prices 
internationally encourage output. Where food imports are not restricted 
by taxes, licenses or lack of foreign exchange similar considerations 
apply to grain production competing with imports, but such cases are in a 
distinct minority. For food crops more generally evidence suggests that 
price may not usually be the main problem. Food prices have risen faster 
than either wages or the cost of living in most African economies since 
1979. Where this is not the position in respect of official prices, 
peasants often sell on parallel markets and so do benefit from the higher 
prices.
A second reason is the general economic situation. Agricultural inputs - 
even hoes - are in scarce supply because of decreased import capacity. 
The general economic situation is also causing processing and transport 
capacity to break down and has the effect of depriving food producers of 
the domestic manufactures and other goods that would serve as an 
incentive for them to bring their produce to the market.
A third reason is the lack of basic health, water and education in many 
rural areas. This provides a very strong disincentive to staying on the 
farm. The more ambitious leave for the urban areas, where such services 
are better. Of those who stay, it may be observed that peasants who are 
often ill or illiterate or both and who - especially women and girls - 
often have to spend much of their time walking many miles to get wood and 
water are not likely to be very productive.
A fourth reason is the overemphasis on large mechanized farms, and on 
large scale centrally organized irrigation schemes - an overemphasis 
still promoted by many external bodies. Mechanized agriculture in Africa 
- at least for staple food production - requires skilled management, 
fuel, and capital and is therefore import intensive. It often yields a 
poor return on capital employed even when - as in Zimbabwe - it is 
technically efficient. The same is usually true of large scale, 
centrally run irrigation schemes - as in Senegal, Mali, Northern Nigeria
- 1 5 -
(Sudan and Kenya are partial exceptions). These divert government 
expertise, personnel and funds away from addressing the cental problems 
of peasant agriculture.
A fifth cause is changes in residential and occupational structure. In 
1960 about SO? of households were peasant producers and in 1980 about 
65?. Taken with population growth this would have required a 50? 
increase per peasant household in food production to maintain output per 
capita.
Finally, - in contrast to South and Southeast Asia - SSA has benefited 
very little from research and technology development tested in the field 
for economic viability to growers and for peasant useability. Extension 
services are weak and peasants are cautious in adopting innovations 
(rightly so as their lives are at stake and much past advice has been 
wrong). But the basic problem is lack of known, tested knowledge on how 
output can be raised within specific ecological, labour, input and 
capital constraints and the grower's net income benefit from that 
increase enough to justify his accepting the extra risk and putting in 
the extra effort required. More attention from the International Crops 
Research Institutes (especially ICRISAT), more coordinated regional work 
(as in SADCC on sorghum, millet and grain legumes) and more carefully 
planned programmes are needed, especially for food crops. This is an 
area in which external initiatives and support are both necessary and 
likely to be welcomed. Without additional knowledge, extension (and 
related inputs) it is hard to see how total output per peasant household 
can rise significantly on a sustained basis, especially because 
increasing population is shortening the fallow periods in traditional 
land use rotation systems and forcing increasing use of sub-marginal 
land.
DO MOT SSA ECONOMIES URGENTLY NEED 'TO GET THE PRICES RIGHT’?
Certainly. Present exchange rates (foreign exchange prices), grower 
prices and price controls are often unrealistic and counter-productive. 
But, given the prevailing situations, price corrections often can be made 
only in conjunction with other measures.
- 16 -
If prevailing staple grain prices are only half what growers need to 
break even, they need to be changed. But such prices cannot be adjusted 
overnight with no other action. If they are there will be reactions by 
workers (whether riots, strikes or absenteeism) imperilling both public 
order and production. Alternatively there will need to be compensating - 
or partially compensating - wage increases and/or additional food 
supplies to reduce ’parallel market’ grain prices.
If devaluation is not accompanied by external finance to permit increased
imports to restore local production ( e.g of simple manufactured goods),
and the processing and transport of exports, it will usually simply set
off new inflationary spirals which rapidly cancel out the devaluation's 
initial price correction. Because IMF resources and quotas do not permit 
drawings large enough to meet these import requirements, most IMF 
programmes must be accompanied by World Bank and bilateral finance 
packages if they are to succeed.
At issue are not simply relative price changes - real wages in many 
African states have fallen 50* since 1979 and except for the Francophone 
states (who have recently floated down with the franc) most have devalued 
massively in nominal and in some cases real terms. Questions of phasing 
and of the need to take supply increasing steps parallel with price 
corrections are also important. As the World Bank pointed out in its 
1982 WDR and even more forcefully in its 1984 submission to the 
Development Committee, additional resources are necessary not simply to 
make price corrections compatible with political stability but even to 
allow them the chance of having any lasting economic effect.
WHAT ABOUT INVESTMENT?
Further investment is urgent, but not primarily in new capacity. 
Patterns of investment need to be changed every bit as much as relative 
prices.
Key elements of present productive capacity and infrastruture throughout 
SSA are deteriorating for lack of maintenance. Many production and
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transport units have deteriorated so extensively that they require major 
rehabilitation. This should have top priority in gross investment. 
Investment in new capacity will often make no addition to output; it may 
simply reduce the general level of capacity utilisation.
This is partly the responsibility of aid and credit agencies. It is much 
easier to secure funding for a new highway than for rehabilitation of an 
endangered one; it is still more difficult to get finance for the 
equipment and training of maintenance units.
Selective new investments to raise production possibilities in respect of 
exports and substitutes for present imports (especially food and energy) 
are needed. But in general much more attention (and external support) 
needs to go to maintenance, rehabilitation and the fuller use of existing 
capital stock.
SHOULDN'T SSA ECONOMIES BE PRACTISING AUSTERITY?
Most are. Taking into account population growth and terms of trade 
losses, Zambia's per capita use of resources has fallen by nearly 5 0 % 
3ince 1975. Total constant price expenditure on public sevices in 
Tanzania (excluding debt service) has been reduced each year since 
1979-80 - with a total fall the order of 20*. Real civil service wages 
and salaries are down 20* or more since 1979 in a majority of African 
states and 5 0% or more in a significanat number. Import volume cuts are 
frequently of the same order of magnitude.
As the IMF has said with regard to the import cuts, this type of 
wholesale austerity is becoming counter productive. At the international 
level it is both a drag on the recovery of world trade and - because it 
is eroding exports and making debt service burdens look ever more 
unbearable - raises risks of deliberate defaults or - more probably - of 
defaults through sheer inability to pay. Nationally it is eroding both 
incentives to work hard (by peasants, wage earners, civil servants and 
managers alike) and the capacity to provide minimum critical services 
(e.g. power, water, education, health, agricultural extension).
« *
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What it has not been able to achieve by itself is the freeing of 
sufficient resources either to restore external balance or to end 
recurrent budget deficits. In many countries there is an acute danger 
that further cuts will merely have the effect of diminishing exports and 
government revenue yet further.
Continued austerity - tempered once real output per capita, government 
revenue and exports begin to recover - is critical. But it will only 
work if more foreign exchange to restore production and government 
revenue is also available. In some cases this may largely require 
altering the balance of external financial flows toward maintenance, 
rehabilitation and operating inputs. In others - as with the 
rehabilitation programmes of major commercial enterprises - more external 
grants and credits will be required if the austerity is to pay off.
IS THERE A CASE FOR MORE POLICY DIALOGUE?
Of course, if it really is dialogue. 3oth donors and African states have 
made mistakes, need to reassess and to revise their programmes, and are 
(or ought to be) unsure what really will work now. There is an urgent 
need to get away from casting blame, making rhetorical generalisations, 
trying to compress very complex and specific problems into one sentence 
slogans. Serious policy dialogues aimed at seeing in specific contexts 
what the critical problems are, what has been prescribed and attempted in 
the past successfully or unsuccessfully, what actions should and can be 
undertaken now - such dialogues could be very useful.
Preaching and imposing programmes (which is what most SSA governments 
currently think invitations to dialogue actually mean) will not be 
useful. First, many of the actions now criticized: e.g. early 1970’s
grain price reductions, emphasis on mechanized agriculture, 
overinvestment in large factories, international airports, etc. were 
advocated and financed by some of todays present most confident critics. 
Second, generalized prescriptions from a long distance rarely correspond 
well to specific realities. Third, imposed programmes may well be 
accepted but usually only after an economy is in a state of nearly 
complete collapse and with a limited commitment to working steadfastly
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for their implementation. These conditions do not augur well for the 
success of even the most soundly conceived programmes.
3ecause the situation in most SSA economies is very serious, because past 
results suggest serious errors in donor and recipient policies and 
analysis, because the present context requires policy changes and because 
specific programmes must relate to actual national contexts (not 
generalisations intended to apply to 30 countries), and because difficult 
policies require genuine national understanding and backing if they are 
to work - dialogue is critical. But it needs to be clear that what is
intended really is dialogue, in which donors acknowledge that they too
need to learn more in order to formulate sensible programmes for their
own actions. Only on that basis is any contribution to the design of
rehabilitation and recovery programmes for SSA countries likely to prove 
successful.
